

Department of Health and Human Services

**OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES DID NOT ACCOUNT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS IN ITS
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
PROCESSES**

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A-18-20-06200

Office of Inspector General

<https://oig.hhs.gov>

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OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES FINDINGS AND OPINIONS

The designation of financial or management practices as questionable, a recommendation for the disallowance of costs incurred or claimed, and any other conclusions and recommendations in this report represent the findings and opinions of OAS. Authorized officials of the HHS operating divisions will make final determination on these matters.

Report in Brief

Date: July 2021

Report No. A-18-20-06200

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL



Why OIG Did This Audit

We conducted this audit in response to a congressional request to determine whether the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS's) enterprise risk management (ERM) process includes steps to identify and assess national security risks. The congressional request was prompted by a previous OIG audit that determined that national security risks were not adequately considered by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Specifically, we found that NIH did not consider the risk presented by foreign principal investigators when permitting access to United States genomic data. The Congressmen stated that they are concerned that CMS also has not considered national security risks to its programs.

Our objective was to determine whether CMS's ERM process considered national security risks to all CMS programs in accordance with Federal requirements.

How OIG Did This Audit

We reviewed CMS's ERM process and risk assessment policies and procedures, reviewed additional supporting risk management documentation, and interviewed CMS and HHS personnel.

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Did Not Account for National Security Risks in Its Enterprise Risk Management Processes

What OIG Found

CMS's ERM process did not consider national security risks for any of CMS's programs in accordance with Federal requirements. CMS lacked policies and procedures that required its programs to consider national security threats because it relied on HHS's ERM process. As a result, CMS was unable to ensure that it had implemented effective controls to protect against threats from foreign and domestic adversaries.

What OIG Recommends and CMS's Comments

We recommend that CMS, as part of its ERM program, implement a process to assess all of its programs for national security risks in accordance with OMB Circular No. A-123's requirement to include new or emerging risks in the risk profile.

In written comments to our draft report, CMS concurred with our recommendation. CMS also stated that it currently participates in the HHS enterprise risk management process, is in the early stages of establishing an agency enterprise risk management program, and will consider how to assess national security risks across its programs.

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INTRODUCTION

WHY WE DID THIS AUDIT

We conducted this audit in response to a congressional request to determine whether the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS's) enterprise risk management (ERM) process includes steps to identify and assess national security risks.¹ The congressional request was prompted by a previous Office of Inspector General audit that determined that national security risks were not adequately considered by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).² Specifically, we found that NIH did not consider the risk presented by foreign principal investigators when permitting access to United States genomic data. The Congressmen stated that they are concerned that CMS also has not considered national security risks to its programs.

OBJECTIVE

Our objective was to determine whether CMS's ERM process considered national security risks to all CMS programs in accordance with Federal requirements.

BACKGROUND

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services

CMS, which is part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), oversees Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs. These programs are responsible for protecting large volumes of sensitive health data.³

HHS Office of National Security

Created in 2002, the HHS Office of National Security (ONS) is responsible for integrating intelligence and security information into HHS policy and operational decisions. As the HHS Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator, ONS works with other Federal departments and

¹ "Enterprise Risk Management is an effective agencywide approach to addressing the full spectrum of the organization's significant risks by considering the combined array of risks as an interrelated portfolio rather than addressing risks only within silos." Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123, *Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control*. Issued July 15, 2016.

² *Opportunities Exist for the National Institutes of Health To Strengthen Controls in Place To Permit and Monitor Access to Its Sensitive Data*. Issued February 5, 2019. Access online at <https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region18/181809350.pdf>.

³ CMS's information systems process millions of highly sensitive pieces of information, including personally identifiable information (PII), protected health information (PHI), and Federal Tax Information (FTI) records. (The CMS Cyber Threat Intelligence *Operations Standard Operating Procedures*, dated Jan. 16, 2019.)

agencies, including law enforcement organizations, to protect HHS and its information from national security threats. ONS also works with HHS's operating divisions as part of the HHS Insider Threat Program. ONS officials stated that ONS considers the protection of program beneficiaries' personally identifiable information (PII), which includes genomic data, to be a national security concern. ONS also considers divulging PII to a foreign adversarial State to be a national security breach.

HOW WE CONDUCTED THIS AUDIT

We reviewed CMS's ERM process and risk assessment policies and procedures, reviewed additional supporting risk management documentation, and interviewed CMS and HHS personnel.

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Appendix contains the details of our scope and methodology.

FINDINGS

CMS's ERM process did not consider national security risks for any CMS programs in accordance with Federal requirements. CMS lacked policies and procedures that required its programs to consider national security threats because it relied on HHS's ERM process. As a result, CMS was unable to ensure that it had implemented effective controls to protect against threats from foreign and domestic adversaries.

CMS DID NOT ASSESS NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS FOR ANY OF ITS PROGRAMS

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, *Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control*, requires that agencies, at least annually, prepare or update their complete risk profile and include required risk components and elements.⁴ The primary purpose of a risk profile is to provide a thoughtful analysis of the risks an agency faces in attempting to attain its strategic objectives and to identify appropriate options for addressing the significant risks faced by programs. When conducting risk assessment, an agency should identify internal and external risks that may prevent the organization from meeting its objectives. When identifying risks, the agency should take into account relevant interactions within the organization as well as with outside organizations. As

⁴ A risk profile is a prioritized inventory of the most significant risks identified and assessed through the risk assessment process.

part of the risk profile's identification of risk step, agencies are required to conduct continuous risk identification in order to identify new or emerging risks.

CMS did not generate an agency risk profile as a component of its ERM program. Instead, CMS relied on HHS's Department-level ERM process, which did not include detailed analysis of the risks CMS and its programs faced. Although some CMS programs have access to PII and other sensitive data that adversaries may attempt to access, CMS policies and procedures did not mandate that programs consider national security risks, even though ONS had advised all HHS agencies, to include CMS, that national security is a new or emerging risk. CMS's Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) program, which oversees and regulates approximately 260,000 non-research testing laboratories in the United States and internationally⁵, is an example of a program that could benefit from an assessment of national security risks. By not assessing national security risks and implementing mitigating controls, CMS programs and their related data are vulnerable to foreign and domestic adversarial threats.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, as part of its ERM program, implement a process to assess all of its programs for national security risks in accordance with OMB Circular No. A-123's requirement to include new or emerging risks in the risk profile.

CMS COMMENTS

In written comments to our draft report, CMS concurred with our recommendation. CMS also stated that it currently participates in the HHS enterprise risk management process, is in the early stages of establishing an agency enterprise risk management program, and will consider how to assess national security risks across its programs. CMS's response is included in its entirety as Appendix B.

OIG RESPONSE

We are encouraged that CMS has taken steps to further safeguard its programs and their related data against new or emerging risks, including national security risks.

⁵ Non-research testing laboratories examine "materials derived from the human body for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings" (42 CFR § 493.2).

APPENDIX A: AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

SCOPE:

We reviewed the CMS ERM process, risk assessment policies, HHS's policies and procedures related to assessing and addressing foreign and domestic threats, and additional supporting documents provided by CMS, and interviewed CMS and HHS personnel. We conducted our audit work from January 2020 through May 2021.

METHODOLOGY:

To accomplish our objective, we:

- reviewed applicable Federal regulations and guidance;
- reviewed CMS's ERM policies, procedures, and practices;
- reviewed CMS's documentation related to its information security risk assessments, insider threat implementation plan, and national security information policy;
- interviewed CMS officials;
- interviewed HHS officials, including those at ONS; and
- discussed our findings with CMS officials.

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

APPENDIX B: CMS COMMENTS



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services

Administrator
Washington, DC 20201

DATE: June 17, 2021

TO: Amy J. Frontz
Deputy Inspector General for Audit Services
Office of Inspector General

FROM: Chiquita Brooks-LaSure
Administrator
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services *Chiquita Brooks-LaSure*

SUBJECT: Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Did Not Account for National Security Risks in Its Enterprise Risk Management Processes (A-18-20-06200)

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) draft report.

The security of CMS systems and patient data is a top priority for CMS. CMS's Office of Strategy, Performance, and Results oversees and is accountable for the development of an enterprise risk management (ERM) function that will provide risk analysis, assessment, and mitigation services to support CMS functions. Ensuring tight coupling with agency strategic priorities, this capability will amplify the many component level risk management activities already underway to an enterprise perspective. As noted in the OIG's report, CMS currently participates in the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) enterprise risk management process to support efforts across the department and is currently assessing how best to integrate CMS's cybersecurity and national security risks into an agency enterprise risk management program.

To secure against potential vulnerabilities, CMS vigilantly monitors, tests, and strengthens its systems against cyber-attacks, both foreign and domestic, and has procedures and processes in place to quickly identify, mitigate, and remove threats, in accordance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requirements and guidelines issued by the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). Since 2015, CMS has participated in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program, which is a dynamic approach to fortifying the cybersecurity of government networks and systems. CDM provides federal departments and agencies with capabilities and tools that identify cybersecurity risks on an ongoing basis, prioritizes these risks based upon potential impacts, and enables cybersecurity personnel to mitigate the most significant problems first.

CMS's Office of Information Technology provides guidance and oversight for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CMS's information and information systems. CMS collects and analyzes threat intelligence, develops threat responses, tracks threat remediation

activities, and receives third party threat intelligence and reports on program operations. The Office of Information Technology also supports business and system owners across CMS by developing and implementing counterintelligence, insider threat, supply chain risk management and Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) programs. These programs serve to identify and prevent the exploitation of CMS personnel, information, and assets by foreign intelligence and security services, terrorists, or transnational criminal organizations working under the direction of a foreign entity. Once mature these programs will identify and monitor threats, assess vulnerabilities in CMS contracts, and mitigate the potential impact from loss of sensitive or restricted information or damage to critical infrastructure by both insiders and foreign adversaries.

OIG's recommendations and CMS's responses are below.

OIG Recommendation

The OIG recommends that CMS, as part of its ERM program, implement a process to assess all of its programs for national security risks in accordance with OMB Circular No. A-123's requirement to include new or emerging risks in the risk profile

CMS Response

CMS concurs with this recommendation. CMS currently participates in the HHS enterprise risk management process to support efforts across the department. In addition, CMS is in the early stages of establishing an agency enterprise risk management program and will consider how to assess national security risks across its programs as part of this effort.